Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Boud; David A. Wilde; Ashton, Braunberger, Poulsen & Boud; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Lewis B. Quigley; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley; Attorney for Defendant .
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, No. 900559.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3359

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATRICK CULLUM and
TARRIE LARKIN, the guardian
ad litem of TAMMY YATES,
a minor,

SUPREME COURT NO. 900901542

Plaintiff-Appellant.

qtosfl

vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF

On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
.S9

DOCKET NO.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEF

T^^'T

JAMES R. BOUD
DAVID A. WILDE
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.
302 West 5400 South
Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

LEWIS B. QUIGLEY, ESQ.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

FILED
JUN 2 4 1992
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION: RULE 29(b) (16)

^ IPRFMECOURT

UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATRICK CULLUM and
TARRIE LARKIN, the guardian
ad litem of TAMMY YATES,
a minor,

SUPREME COURT NO. 900901542

Plaintiff-Appellant.
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF

On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge.
JAMES R. BOUD
DAVID A. WILDE
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN &
BOUD, P.C.
302 West 5400 South
Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
LEWIS B. QUIGLEY, ESQ.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION: RULE 29(b) (16)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

POINT I -

1

WAGNER V. FARMERS INSURANCE

POINT II- ALLSTATE INS. CO. V. U.S. FIDELITY & GUARANTEE
CO. HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE IN THIS CASE. . . .

6

POINT III- UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31A-22-303(1)(c)
DOES NOT EVIDENCE ANY LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO
ALLOW LOWER COVERAGE FOR PERMISSIVE USERS IN
ALL SITUATIONS

8

POINT IV - UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31A-21-106 PROHIBITS
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE OF "ANY PROVISION" . . 11
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

13

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co,.
619 P. 2d 329 (Utah 1980)

6

Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co. , 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P. 2d 388 (1984)

4

Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 236
(Utah 1985)

2-3

Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 419 P.2d 168 (1966)

5

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)

10

Matter of Estate of Estes, 718 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1986) . . . .

10

Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934
(Utah 1980)

10

State v. Flores. 772 P.2d 589 (Ariz. App. 1989)

10

State of Tabaha. 714 P.2d 1010 (N.M. App. 1986)

10

State Farm v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987)

5

Wagner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763
(Utah App. 1990)

1

Weitekamp v. Fireman Fund Insurance Company, 709 P.2d 908
(Ariz. App. 1985)

10

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-21-106

11-12

Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-303(1)(c)
Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-303(2)(c) and (d)

8-10
. . .

9-10

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-12-20(b)(2)

7

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-12-21(g)

7

(ii)

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Abraham, Judge Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance;
the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured,
67 Va.L.Rev.; 1151 (1981)

Honoring

Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 7382,
pp. 23-24

3
12

Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 961, 967 (1970) . . . . . .

3

Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, 371 (1960)

4

Murray, The Parole Evidence Process and Standardized
Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1342, 1389 (1975)

4

i

(

(iii)

POINT I
WAGNER VS. FARMERS INSURANCE
The Brief of Appellee discusses the case of Wagner vs.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 1990).

This

case was not referred to in Appellant's Brief for three reasons:
(1) the factual circumstances were somewhat different, (2) the
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is not controlling before
this Court, and

(3) the present case raises new issues not

considered by the Court of Appeals in Wagner.

However, Farmers

reference to this case does raise a "new matter" as described in
Utah R. App. Proc. 24(c).

This "new matter" should be addressed

in more than passing reference.
The Wagner case involved a decedent who died in a motor
vehicle accident.

At the time of the accident, the decedent was

riding as a passenger in his own car which was driven by a friend
who had little or no insurance.

The decedent had purchased an

insurance policy with underinsured policy limits of $100,000.00
and his wife claimed after his death that she should be paid
$100,000.00 in damages for the death of her husband. The insurance
company relied on a clause in the policy identical to the one which
is at issue in this case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the

clause at issue served to limit the liability of the insurance
company to $20,000.00.
Plaintiff's major argument in Wagner was directed
towards the "reasonable expectations of the insured" issue. Mrs.
Wagner claimed that her husband had purchased insurance which he
1

reasonably believed would provide coverage of $100,000.00 under the
circumstances of his accident, and that those reasonable
expectations should be honored by the Court and the insurance
company.
The reasonable expectations theory is something that
should be considered by the Court in this case.

The insurance

policy at issue in this case stated:
We will pay damages for which any insured
person is legally liable because of bodily
injury to any person and property damage
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of a private passenger car, a utility car,
or a utility trailer.
Many

paragraphs

later,

under

the

heading

"Other

Insurance,11 the insurance company placed the following language:
We will provide insurance for an insured
person, other than you or a family memberf up
to the limits of the financial responsibility
law only.
In analyzing the provisions of an insurance policy, it
must be borne in mind that they are not typical contracts, the
terms of which are bargained for by the parties.

As this Court

noted in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah
1985),
Automobile insurance is generally sold through
adhesion contracts that are not negotiated at
arm's length. Purchasers commonly rely on the
assumption that they are fully covered by the
insurance that they buy.
An insurance purchaser generally requests particular
categories

of

coverage

(liability,

uninsured

motorist)

in

particular amounts and the insurer responds by sending out a policy
2

which purports to grant such coverage.

To the extent that the

policy issued, by its terms, unreasonably excludes the very
coverage requested its terms should not be literally applied.

As

one scholar has indicated:
The objectively reasonable expectations of the
applicant and intended beneficiaries regarding
the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 Harv.L.Rev. 961, 967 (1970).

Public

policy

"requires

that

persons

purchasing

automobile insurance policies are entitled to be informed, in
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially
exclusionary terms." Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, supra, at 236.
If this information is provided by a writing which can only be
understood by a lawyer, it is unreasonable to assume that the
policy purchaser has been placed on notice regarding the way in
which the policy issued deviates from the coverage requested.
Therefore, to apply the policy's literal terms would be to allow
the insurer to accept the applicant's "offer" by issuing a policy
which is, in reality, a counteroffer, though the applicant doesn't
understand it to be such.
Much has been written in recent years concerning the
emergence

of

the

"new"

theory

of

honoring

the

reasonable

expectations of insureds when construing insurance contracts. See,
e.g., Abraham, Judge Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance:

Honoring

the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va.L.Rev.; 1151
3

(1981);

Keeton,

Supra.

Proper

analysis

of

the

reasonable

expectations theory, however, demonstrates that it is neither a new
nor radical approach to contract law.

As the Supreme Court of

Arizona noted in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984):
"Emergence"
is
probably
an
inaccurate
description of the use of the reasonable
expectations
test
since,
if
correctly
understood, that doctrine has long been a
basic principle in the law of contracts.
682 P.2d at 394.
The essence of the reasonable expectations approach to
insurance policies is simply that certain standardized boiler plate
provisions of insurance contracts, which are almost invariably
contracts of adhesion, don't in fact correctly state the real
"agreement" made between an insured and an insurer's selling agent.
i

Though courts have, on occasion, blurred the distinction, it is
important to remember that while a written standardized policy "may
be coextensive with the agreement, it is not the agreement but only
evidence thereof."
Standardized

Murray, The Parole Evidence Process and

Agreements

under

the

Restatement

Contracts, 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1342, 1389 (1975).

(Second)

Indeed, as another

commentator has acknowledged:
Any contract with boiler-plate results in two
several contracts: the dickered deal and the
collateral one of supplementary boiler-plate.
Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, 371 (1960).
As noted by the Court in Darner, supra:
Thus, in insurance law, as in other areas of
contract law, the parole evidence rule has not
4

of

been strictly applied to enforce an illusory
"bargain" set forth in a standardized contract
when that "bargain" was never really made and
would, if applied, defeat the true agreement
which was supposedly contained in the policy.
682 P.2d at 396.
The principle of construing adhesion contracts in a
manner which would honor the reasonable expectations of the insured
was adopted by the California Supreme Court in the leading case of
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.. 65 Cal.2d 263, 419 P.2d 168 (1966):
Although courts have long followed the basic
precept that they would look to the words of
the contract to find the meaning which the
parties expected from them, they have also
applied the doctrine of adhesion contract to
insurance policies, holding that in view of
the disparate bargaining status of the parties
we must ascertain that meaning of the contract
which the insured would reasonably expect.
419 p.2d at 171-172.
Justice Durham, in a dissenting opinion in State Farm vs.
Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) discussed issues of reasonable
expectation and adhesion contract theories:
Judicial determination of the insured's
reasonable expectations does not necessarily
depend upon the presence of an ambiguity in
the policy. (Citations omitted.) Indeed, the
insured's complete failure to read the
policy's
provisions,
exclusions,
or
limitations, may not be determinative of his
reasonable expectations unless the insurer can
demonstrate that the failure to read was
unreasonable. (Citations omitted.)
Though Justice

Durham's

opinion was

dissenting, it

appears that her opinion was actually in the majority, except as
to her conclusion that the "household exclusion clause" (which was
at issue in that case) should be held invalid even prior to the
5

amendments to the insurance code made in 1986.
The insurance contract at issue, like all insurance
contracts, is a contract of adhesion. It is a contract filled with
numerous provisions, clauses, limitations and exclusions.

The

average person could not be expected to understand the limitation
or exclusion which the insurance company claims is provided by the
clause at issue in this case. The average person would reasonably
expect that he had purchased insurance which would provide coverage
of $100,000.00 to himself, any family member, or any person using
his car with his permission.

The reasonable expectations of the

insured should be honored.
POINT II
ALLSTATE INS. CO. V. U.S. FIDELITY & GUARANTEE CO.
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE IN THIS CASE
Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 619
P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), also relied upon by Appellant, was a case
which was decided under prior Utah law, which law has now been
amended.

In that case, USF&G had insured Brookfield Products with

a motor vehicle liability policy. USF&G then reviewed the records
of Brookfield employees who had been listed as potential drivers
of Brookfield vehicles.

After reviewing these records, USF&G

notified Brookfield that it would not provide coverage for an
employee by the name of Pulliam.

Brookfield then took steps to

insure that Pulliam would not drive its vehicles.

However, a

situation later arose where no one was available to drive except
Pulliam, and Brookfield therefore allowed Pulliam to drive its
6

truck to Heber City.

Pulliam became involved in an accident which

resulted in the death of another driver insured by Allstate.
Allstate paid the estate of the deceased driver under its
uninsured motorist coverage.

Allstate then filed a declaratory

judgment action against USF&G alleging that it was illegal to
attempt to exclude coverage for Pulliam and any other permissive
user.

This argument was based on Section 41-12-20(b)(2) of the

former statute, which provided:

"(An) owner's policy of liability

insurance . . . shall insure the person named therein and any other
person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles
with the express or implied permission of such named insured..."
The Supreme Court accepted this argument.

However, the

Supreme Court also ruled that the coverage required for permissive
users would not be required to extend above and beyond the minimum
statutory requirements.

The Court stated, "Rather, contracting

parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum
required limits, and the exclusion found in the contract is valid
in relation to any coverage exceeding the minimum amounts." (Id.
at 333) In so ruling the Court specifically referred to former
Section 41-12-21(g) which stated:

"Any policy which grants the

coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also
grant any lawful coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability
policy and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject
to the provisions of this Act . . . "
There are major differences between the statute which
was in force at the time the Allstate case was decided, and the
7

statute which is applicable to this case.

There is no provision

in the Utah Insurance Code in existence today which specifically
states

that

coverage

in

excess

of

the

minimum

requirements are not subject to the No-Fault Act.

statutory

Rather, there

are specific provisions regarding those circumstances when coverage
may be limited for permissive users.
The Legislature established a commission to revise the
Insurance Code in 1981. This commission consisted of many of the
finest legal and insurance minds in the state and spent four years
and countless man hours before finally recommending its revision
to the Legislature in 1985.

That revised statute has now been

adopted by the Legislature.

Certainly this Court must conclude

that the Legislature believed that the statute in existence prior
to 1985 was inadequate.

Therefore, case law based on the prior

inadequate statute certainly has no precedential or binding effect
on this Court today.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31A-22-303(1)(C)
EVIDENCE ANY

DOES NOT

LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO ALLOW LOWER COVERAGE

FOR PERMISSIVE USERS IN ALL SITUATIONS
Farmers relies upon Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22303(1)(c) which states as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (7) , [a
policy of motor vehicle liability coverage .
. . shall] insure persons related to the named
insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship who are residents of the named
insured's household, including those who
usually make their home in the same household
8

but temporarily live elsewhere, to the same
extent as the named insured.
Farmers argues that this provision which omits any
reference to permissive users, provides evidence of a Legislative
intent to allow permissive users to be insured in a lesser amount
than the insurance required for the named insured and related
persons.
Farmers has conveniently ignored the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated Section 31A-22-303(2) (c) and (d) . Without quoting
these provisions verbatim (they are quoted in Plaintiff's prior
Brief) these sections state that coverage for permissive users may
be limited to the minimum statutory amount in those situations
where a "motor vehicle business" is involved. Plaintiff has argued
previously

that

the

Legislative

intent

evidenced

by

these

provisions is to allow lower coverage for permissive users only in
the situation where a "motor vehicle business" is involved. There
is thus apparent conflict between 31A-22-303(1)(C) and 31A-22303(2)(c) and (d).
Legislators presumably do not intend to draft statutes
which have conflicting provisions, or which contain provisions
which are redundant or meaningless. It is an elementary principle
of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed to be
internally harmonious if such construction is possible. Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245 (Utah 1988); Weitekamp v. Fireman Fund
Insurance Company, 709 P.2d 908 (Ariz. App. 1985); Matter of Estate
of Estes, 718 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1986).

Another fundamental principal

of statutory construction is that the language and provisions of
9

a statute should be construed so as to render all parts of the
statute relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations which
would render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd should
be avoided.

Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation. 609 P. 2d 934

(Utah 1980); State v. Tabaha, 714 P.2d 1010 (N.M. App. 1986); State
v. Flores. 772 P.2d 589 (Ariz. App. 1989).
If, as Farmers argues, the Legislature intended by the
language in 31A-22-303(1)(c) to allow an insurance company, in all
situations, to provide lesser coverage to a permissive user than
to the named insured and his relatives, then the question must be
answered as to why the Legislature would, in the very next section
of the statute, discuss specific limited

situations in which

coverage for permissive users can be so limited.

Put another way,

if Section 303(1)(c) is interpreted as Farmers argues, then the
provisions of Section 303(2)(c) and (d) are rendered meaningless,
redundant, and of no consequence.
This Court must assume that the Legislature intended to
do something meaningful by enacting Section 303(2)(c) and (d) .
This Court must further assume that the Legislature intended that
the provisions of Section 303(1)(c) and 303(2)(c) and (d) could be
understood and interpreted in a harmonious and consistent manner.
With

these

principles

in

mind,

a

harmonious

and

consistent construction between the two sections of the statute is
possible.

Likewise, an interpretation which gives effect to both

of the provisions is possible.

Such construction is possible if

we assume that the Legislature, in enacting Section 303(1)(c),
10

intended that there would be some situations where permissive users
for an insured's vehicle would not have the same coverage as the
insured

and

related parties.

We can then assume that the

Legislature went on in subsection 303(2)(c) and (d) to delineate
those circumstances (i.e., involving motor vehicle businesses) when
a permissive user could be granted lower coverage than those
provided to the named insured and related parties.
Such construction harmonizes and gives full effect to
what would otherwise be conflicting provisions of the statute. In
fact, the above interpretation is the only interpretation which
gives meaning and effect to both of the otherwise conflicting
provisions.

It is therefore the only reasonable interpretation

which this Court can adopt.
POINT IV
SECTION 31A-21-106 PROHIBITS INCORPORATION BY
REFERENCE OF "ANY PROVISION"
Farmers has argued that Utah Code Annotated Section 31A21-106, prohibiting

insurance

contracts which

incorporate by

reference, does not apply to incorporation by reference of a
statute. This argument ignores the plain provisions of the statute
which clearly state:
No insurance policy may contain any agreement
or incorporate any provision not fully set
forth in the policy . . .(Emphasis added.)
Despite this clear and unequivocal language, Farmers
argues that statutes are automatically incorporated by reference
into every insurance contract, citing the authority of Appleman
11

Insurance Law and Practice. Section 7382, at pages 23 and 24 which
states:
Insurance policies are governed by statutory
requirements in force and effect at the time
such policies are written. Such provisions
are read into each policy issued thereunder
and become a part of the contract with full
binding effect upon each party.
Such
provisions being a part of the contract by
implication, they cannot be contracted away by
either party. (Emphasis added.)
This authority, with which Plaintiffs agree, cannot be
interpreted as Farmers suggests.

Insurance statutes are intended

to govern and restrict insurance companies, and provide protection
to insurance purchasers. Thus, an insurance company cannot prepare
an insurance contract which is contrary to the mandates of the
insurance statute, and thereby deprive an insured of protection or
benefits which the Legislature has mandated that the insured be
provided.
In this regard, the statute is automatically a part of
every policy, protecting the insured from being taken advantage of
by the insurance company.

It is only in this respect that the

statute is incorporated by reference into every insurance contract.
It is untenable to suggest that this principle should be invoked
to allow an insurance company to prepare a contract which creates
greater confusion and uncertainty for the insured, in contradiction
of the clear mandates of the statute.
Farmers claims that Plaintiffs have cited no authority
to support their position that incorporation by reference in the
contract is not allowed.

This is curious in view of Plaintiff's
12

clear reliance on the statute. Indeed, what greater authority than
the statute could be cited.

In reality, it is Farmers which has

cited no authority which would support its position that any
statutory provision can be incorporated by reference even though
that provision is not a requirement of the law.
Farmers claims that a sample paragraph proposed in
Plaintifffs Brief is in itself an acknowledgment that incorporation
by reference is acceptable.

The differences in the proposed

paragraph and the actual language at issue used by Farmers are
obvious.

The proposed language clearly sets forth the limitation

and only makes reference to the statute to provide further clarity.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The insurance clause at issue violates the reasonable
expectations of purchasers of insurance.

On that basis alone, it

should be struck down. Furthermore, the insurance policy violated
the statute in two respects: (1) it attempted to limit coverage for
permissive

users

to

the

minimum

levels

of

the

Financial

Responsibility Law contrary to those situations specified in 31A22-303(2) (c) and

(d) ; and

(2) it attempted to incorporate by

reference a provision which was not expressly recited within the
contract.
The Insurance Code was rewritten after extensive study
and with an express view to protect the rights of the insured from
unscrupulous

activities

of

insurance

companies.

Farmers

contractual provision is in violation of the law and is therefore
of no effect, and this Court should so rule.
13
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